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TATES' and nations' laws collide when foreign factors appear in a
lawsuit. Nonresident litigants, incidents outside the forum, parallel
lawsuits, and judgments from other jurisdictions can create
problems with personal jurisdiction, choice of law, and the recognition of
foreign judgments. This article reviews Texas conflicts cases from Texas
state and federal courts during the Survey period from October 1, 2002,
through November 1, 2003. The article excludes cases involving federal-
state conflicts, intrastate issues such as subject matter jurisdiction and
venue, and conflicts in time, such as the applicability of prior or subse-
quent law within a state. State and federal cases are discussed together
because conflict of laws is mostly a state law topic, except for a few con-
stitutional limits, resulting in the same rules applying to most issues in
state and federal courts.'
The Survey period saw an expansive litigation of forum contests, in-
cluding nine cases based on agency, alter ego, or corporate relationship.
2
In choice of law, the United States Supreme Court issued what may be its
most important ruling in fifty years, holding that the forum state may
apply its own law without balancing the competing interests of other
states, diminishing the constitutional role of interest analysis in choice of
law. 3 Texas state and federal courts continued their development of the
most significant relationship test, including an unusual application of
choice of law to fraudulent joinder in a federal diversity case.4 Foreign
judgments cases followed a similar pattern of routine application of the
uniform acts, but with instructive holdings in several areas of commercial
litigation, arbitration and family law.
I. FORUM CONTESTS
Asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant requires amenabil-
ity to Texas jurisdiction and receipt of proper notice. Amenability may
be established by consent (usually based on contract's forum selection
clause), waiver (failing a timely objection), or extraterritorial service of
process under a Texas long arm statute. Because most aspects of notice
are purely matters of forum law, this article will focus primarily on the
issues relating to amenability.
1. For a thorough discussion of the role of federal law in choice of law questions, see
RUSSELL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 649-95 (4th ed. 2001)
[hereinafter WEINTRAUB].
2. See infra notes 28-45 & 57-58 and accompanying text.
3. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003), discussed infra notes 171-
174 and accompanying text.
4. Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Tex. 2003), dis-
cussed infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
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A. CONSENT AND WAIVER
Contracting parties may agree to a forum selection clause designating
either the optional or exclusive site for litigation or arbitration. When a
contracting party sues in the designated forum, the clause is said to be a
prorogation clause, that is, one supporting the forum's jurisdiction over
the defendant. When a contracting party sues in a non-selected forum in
violation of the contract, the clause is said to be a derogation clause, that
is, one undermining the forum's jurisdiction. Only valid prorogation
clauses establish personal jurisdiction, and they are discussed in this sec-
tion. Derogation clauses are discussed below as a grounds for the forum
to decline otherwise valid jurisdiction. 5
The Survey period produced two cases using forum clauses to establish
Texas jurisdiction. Von Graffenreid v. Craig6 is a very good discussion of
several issues regarding forum clauses, their scope, and their susceptibil-
ity to venue motions. Swiss bank Pictet & Cie loaned $10 million to
Aperian, Inc., a Delaware corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Ari-
zona. Aperian's president, Kevin Craig, persuaded von Graffenreid to
guarantee the loan, with the Guaranty Agreement containing Craig's
promise to indemnify von Graffenreid. When Aperian (now known as
Fourthstage Technologies, Inc.) defaulted, von Graffenreid had to pay
Pictet & Cie. Fourthstage then declared bankruptcy and von Graffenreid
sued Craig, filing in a Dallas federal court based on the Guaranty Agree-
ment's forum clause designating a state or federal court in Dallas at the
guarantor's option.7 Craig challenged the Dallas federal forum (seeking
either dismissal or transfer to Arizona) with the argument that he was not
personally bound by the forum clause. In a very instructive analysis of
forum clauses, the court found that because Craig was personally obli-
gated only to limited portions of the Guaranty Agreement, and because
the forum clause was vague as to its coverage as to the entire Agreement,
that the clause was ambiguous and required looking behind the contract's
express language. After looking at evidence of the parties' negotiations,
the court found that Craig's failure to clarify the ambiguity in drafting the
agreement left him susceptible to the entire Agreement.8 Having found
the clause applicable to Craig, the court then examined whether it was
effective in general. The court found that the clause's non-exclusive lan-
guage created a permissive forum clause that permitted a Dallas forum
but did not require it.9 This led to consideration of Craig's venue transfer
requests, and the court again distinguished the issues of improper venue
(requiring deference to the forum clause) and inconvenient venue (for
5. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 360-61 (2d ed. 1992)
[hereinafter SCOLES & HAY]; James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV.
769, 912-41 (1999) (hereinafter Parallel Litigation). For a discussion of forum derogation
clauses, see infra notes 185-195 and accompanying text.
6. Von Graffenreid v. Craig, 246 F. Supp. 2d 553 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
7. Id. at 555-57.
8. Id. at 558-59.
9. Id. at 560-61.
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which the forum clause is merely a non-determinative factor). That def-
erence allowed the forum clause to withstand any improper venue chal-
lenge, but not the convenience challenge.10 Reviewing the various factors
for a federal inconvenient forum challenge, the court found that the pres-
ence of important witnesses and evidence in Arizona and the loan's
strong connections there (in spite of contrary boilerplate language) com-
pelled transfer to Arizona."
Automotive Consultants v. Farls'2 illustrates the pitfalls of agency law
and signing capacity. The case arose from a Dallas marketing company's
breach of contract action against a Pennsylvania car dealership and its
owner. In 2001, Automotive Consultants ("AC") entered a marketing
agreement with Northwest Chevrolet, a dba for Northwest Auto, Inc., of
Ambridge, Pennsylvania. When AC's promise of a "time proven" system
of increasing sales apparently failed, Northwest cancelled the contract
and AC sued Northwest's owner, John Farls, in a state court in Dallas.
Farls removed the case to federal court, objected to jurisdiction and alter-
natively sought a venue transfer to Pennsylvania. Farls's motion was un-
dermined by a choice of forum clause in the contract stating that "The
agreement shall be governed and controlled under the laws of the State
of Texas, and adjudicated in the State of Texas."' 13 Farls argued that he
had signed the agreement only as an agent for Northwest Auto, but in an
instructive review of agency law, the court held that the handwritten sub-
script "Owner" beneath his signature resulted in individual responsibility
and not merely that of an agent. The court thus found the forum clause
to be valid and enforceable against Farls individually, and further denied
his venue transfer. 14
B. NONRESIDENT'S FORUM CONTACTS
Texas uses "limits-of-due-process" long-arm statutes, meaning that the
minimum contacts test is the only necessary foundation for personal juris-
diction in Texas. 15 The Texas long arms also apply in Texas federal courts
except where Congress has enacted a federal long arm statute for a very
few federal law claims.16 In spite of due process's dominance, these per-
sonal jurisdiction cases are grouped under the long arm categories.
10. Id. at 562.
11. Id. at 562-64.
12. Automotive Consultants Div., Progressive Mktg. Group, Inc. v. Fans, No.
CIV.A.301CV-171R, 2003 WL 21318320 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2003).
13. Id. at *2.
14. Id. at *2-5.
15. See U-Anchor Adver., Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977). The primary
Texas long arm statutes are found at TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.041-.045,
and others are scattered throughout Texas statutes, e.g., TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 161.132
(Vernon 1982) (violation of certain agricultural statutes); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.305
(Vernon 1998) (nonresident respondents in divorce actions); TEX. INS. CODE ANN.
§ 823.457 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (violations of duties imposed on insurance holding
companies).
16. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (state long arms in federal court) and FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(k)(1)(D) (federal long arm statutes). Examples of federal long arm statutes include 28
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1. The Texas Long Arm in Commercial Cases
In Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. APA Transport Corp.,17 the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court dismissal and held that Texas
was a constitutionally acceptable forum for a dispute over withheld
freight shipments in New Jersey. Plaintiff Central Freight Lines is a
Waco-based company which ships freight primarily throughout the south-
western United States. Central made an "interline agreement" with New
Jersey-based APA Transport and other companies to cooperate in using
each others' shipment services. In March, 2001, CFL notified other carri-
ers in its interline agreement that it anticipated a contract to ship Dell
computers throughout the United States, and asked if any other carriers
would have a problem delivering Dell products under the proposed price
structure. No one objected and the Dell contract got underway. APA
soon began demanding higher freight charges- allegedly 194% of the
agreed price-and withheld delivery until the freight charges were paid.18
Central sued APA in federal court in the Western District of Texas, alleg-
ing breach of contract, tortious interference and other commercial claims.
APA objected to Texas jurisdiction for the New Jersey-based services and
filed its own action against CFL in a New Jersey federal court. On CFL's
motion, the New Jersey federal court stayed its action until the Texas ju-
risdictional question was resolved. After limited discovery, the Texas fed-
eral court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on APA's lack of Texas
contacts.
The Fifth Circuit reversed. Applying the two-part contacts/fairness test
from Burger King, the court first found sufficient contacts in APA's trips
to Texas to negotiate the interline agreement, coupled with APA's knowl-
edge that it was contracting with a company based primarily in Texas. 19
The court found further contacts in APA's intentionally-tortious conduct
aimed at Texas (the allegations of withholding freight were assumed true
in considering jurisdiction). 20 The court then turned to the second ele-
ment-the fair play and substantial justice test looking to (1) the nonresi-
dent defendant's burden, (2) the forum state's interests, (3) the plaintiff's
interest in a convenient forum, (4) the interstate judicial system's interest
in the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared inter-
ests of the states in furthering fundamental social policies.21 The court
found APA's claim of burden unpersuasive, but did consider the fourth
factor-efficient resolution of controversies-in light of the now-resumed
New Jersey action. The court observed that New Jersey might be the
more convenient forum, but concluded that the convenient forum issue
was best considered on remand to the trial court, and held that "APA
U.S.C. § 2361 (2000) for statutory interpleader, and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2000) for claims
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
17. Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. APA Transp. Corp., 322 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2003).
18. Id. at 379.
19. Id. at 382 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)).
20. Id. at 381-83.
21. Id. at 384-85.
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may not avoid the personal jurisdiction of the Western District of Texas
merely because APA did not physically enter the State of Texas to deliver
freight. "22
SITQ E. U., Inc. v. Reata Restaurants, Inc.,23 found jurisdiction over Ca-
nadian and other nonresident defendants regarding actions by tenants for
fraud and negligent misrepresentation in the clean-up-or lack of one-
of Fort Worth's Bank One Tower following the March, 2000 tornado. In
particular, the court of appeals held that the existence of a Texas-resident
landlord (Loutex Fort Worth LP) did not protect its nonresident owners
from jurisdiction when they allegedly participated in the decision to walk
away from the damage rather than repair it. In two similar cases, the
Dallas court of appeals held that nonresident members of a Delaware
limited liability company were amenable to Texas jurisdiction where they
personally committed business torts in Texas, even though their actions
were on behalf of their LLC,24 and the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston held that the fiduciary shield doctrine did not protect
nonresident officers for their own false statements made in Texas.
2 5
In Rynone Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Industries, Inc.,26 the court
found Texas jurisdiction over a Pennsylvania-based company for
countertops to be shipped to New York and Connecticut. Republic In-
dustries is based in Marshall, Texas, and had ordered the synthetic marble
countertops from Rynone after Rynone had soliticited the Texas com-
pany's business. The countertops were made in Pennsylvania and des-
tined for New York and Connecticut, with no physical connection to
Texas. The court nonetheless found Texas jurisdiction based on the speci-
fications having been drawn in Texas, the order placed from Texas, and
the ongoing relationship centered partly in Texas, after Rynone's initial
contact with the Texas plaintiff seeking business.
27
Five cases regarding agency theory defeated and alternatively estab-
lished jurisdiction over nonresidents. The first two involve jurisdiction
based on an agent's forum activities. In Walker Insurance Services v. Bot-
tle Rock Power Corp.,28 a Houston insurance examiner sued a California
power company for its commission on a bond obtained in Texas pursuant
to the California company's intended acquisition of a Texas power plant.
Walker, the Houston party, had dealt with another Texas resident named
22. Id. at 385.
23. SITQ E.U., Inc. v. Reata Rest., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 638 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003,
no pet.).
24. Boissiere v. Nova Capital, LLC, 106 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet.
filed).
25. D.H. Blair Inv. Banking Corp. v. Reardon, 97 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (reversing the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction over
a nonresident investment bank, finding its Texas contacts too sporadic to justify
jurisdiction).
26. Rynone Mfg. Corp. v. Republic Indus., Inc., 96 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.).
27. Id. at 638-40.
28. Walker Ins. Servs. v. Bottle Rock Power Corp., 108 S.W.3d 538 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
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Beane who purported to represent the California company Bottle Rock.
The negotiations then shifted from Beane to Bottle Rock's California at-
torney, Hagan, who saw through the bond acquisition (with Walker's
help), but later pleaded ignorance as to Walker's commission. Walker
sued in Texas, basing his jurisdictional argument on his dealings with
Beane. Hagan and Bottle Rock denied Beane's agency status, and the
trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals
reversed, finding first that Beane had apparent authority and second that
Bottle Rock had ratified Beane's actions in any event.29 The opposite
holding resulted in Wichita Falls Builders Wholesale, Inc. v. Jancor Co.,
Inc.,30 where the court rejected plaintiff's argument that Texas had per-
sonal jurisdiction over a Kentucky defendant based on the Texas activities
of its subsidiary.
The third, fourth, and fifth cases involve attempts to assert jurisdiction
over the agent. In Kennedy Ship & Repair, L.P. v. Loc Tran,31 the court
rejected a California defendant's argument that he was merely the agent
for Texas residents and thus not acting in his own capacity when negotiat-
ing shipbuilding contracts in Texas. The opposite result obtained in Lang
v. Capital Resource Investments, I & II, LLC,32 where the Dallas court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's jurisdictional dismissal of an Illinois cor-
porate director sued by a Texas investor when the Illinois venture failed,
and again in Hone v. Hanafin, where the court sustained a nonresident's
objection to jurisdiction based on his acts as defendant corporation presi-
dent who negotiated with Texas lawyers for out of state legal services. 33
In a similar case, not based on agency theory but discussing jurisdiction
based on a corporate relationship, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that
foreign directors of a company partly located in Texas were not amenable
to Texas jurisdiction. Rittenmeyer v. Grauer34 arose from the bankruptcy
of Ameriserve Food Distributors, Inc., a Delaware corporation with man-
agement offices in Wisconsin and Connecticut, and operational offices in
Texas. A planned merger with Pro Source, a larger food distributor
based in Miami, caused Ameriserve to file for bankruptcy. Attempting to
gain funds to pay creditors, the plan administrator sued Ameriserve's par-
ent companies and various directors, including defendants Grauer and
Jamar, both of Connecticut, and Onarheim from Norway. The trial court
sustained the three nonresidents' objections to Texas jurisdiction. The
court of appeals affirmed, finding that Texas was not the company's head-
quarters at the time of the Pro Serve merger vote, and that the directors'
mere act of voting (in a Florida meeting) for the merger was not the
29. Id. at 544-55.
30. Wichita falls Builders Wholesale, Inc. v. Jancor Co., Inc., No. CIV.A.7:01CV196R,
2003 WL 292141 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2003).
31. Kennedy Ship & Repair, L.P. v. Loc Tran, 256 F. Supp. 2d 678 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
32. Lang v. Capital Resource Inves. I & II, LLC, 102 S.W.3d 861 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.).
33. Hone v. Hanafin, No. 05-01-00897-CV, 2003 WL 22020778 (Tex. App.-Dallas
Aug. 28, 2003, no pet. h.) (mem. opinion).
34. Rittenmeyer v. Graver, 104 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
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transacting of business within Texas that could lead the defendants to an-
ticipate being sued here.
35
The Survey period also offered two variations on the vicarious jurisdic-
tion theme using alter ego or veil piercing. In Magic House, A.B. v.
Shelton Beverage, L.P.,36 the Dallas court of appeals found no Texas ju-
risdiction over a Swedish energy drink manufacturer for its alleged out-
of-state manipulation of assets. Magic House A.B. manufactures the en-
ergy drinks Nice and Nexcite, and made an agreement with Michigan-
based Michigan Trading Post, Inc., (MPTI) to be the exclusive American
distributor. MPTI in turn contracted with Shelton Beverage, L.P., for the
Texas distributions, but Shelton soon learned that Texas was already satu-
rated with unauthorized distributions of the drinks through another re-
gional distributor, RLW Marketing, Inc. Pursuant to their agreement,
Shelton arbitrated its claim with MPTI but the resulting award was appar-
ently frustrated because of MPTI's lack of assets. Shelton then sued
Magic House, MPTI and others in a Texas court, alleging that Magic
House controlled MPTI and had fraudulently transferred its assets to de-
feat Shelton's arbitration award. The trial court agreed and denied Magic
House's special appearance, but the Dallas court of appeals reversed,
finding that Magic House had no alter ego relationship with MPTI, and
that Magic House's actions in shipping products into the United States
and arranging for their distribution through MPTI created neither gen-
eral nor specific jurisdiction in Texas. 37 In the second case, Houston's
Fourteenth Court of Appeals found jurisdiction over an Ecuadoran oil
company for claims of unpaid freight charges, but refused to find jurisdic-
tion over the defendant company's majority stockholder under a veil-
piercing theory.38
In one of this year's Enron-related opinions, a Houston federal court
held that Enron Canada was subject to Texas jurisdiction for claims re-
garding its corporate affiliates' debts, but further held that the action was
an improper attempt to circumvent the protection of the bankruptcy
stay.39
In other cases, Texas courts found jurisdiction over two foreign insur-
ers, 40 and found no jurisdiction in (1) a Texas plaintiff's claim of trade
secret misappropriation against a Swedish company related to work per-
35. Id. at 730-36.
36. Magic House, A.B. v. Shelton Beverage, L.P., 99 S.W.3d 903 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.).
37. Id. at 907-12.
38. Intercarga, S.A., v. Fritz Cos., Inc., No. 14-02-00297-CV, 2003 WL 21402583 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 19, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
39. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., v. Enron Canada Corp., 291 B.R. 687 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
40. Walker v. Loiseau, No. 03-02-00328-CV, 2003 WL 21705253 (Tex. App.-Austin
July 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion) (Mississippi-based insurance company sued by a
Texas receiver following Texas Attorney General's action for unauthorized insurance.); Al-
lianz Risk Transfer (Bermuda), Ltd., v. S. J. Camp & Co., 117 S.W.3d 92 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2003, no pet.) (Canadian reinsurer regarding Texas health care insurance).
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formed in Sweden;41 (2) an Oklahoma plaintiff's claim against an
Oklahoma defendant for breach of contract in steel fabrication work for
delivery to Qatar;4 2 (3) a claim against an Argentine oil company for
fraud in a stock purchase agreement relating to drilling rights in Argen-
tina;43 (4) a Texas employer's claim against a Michigan-based employee
for breach of a confidentiality agreement and misappropriation of trade
secrets; an and (5) a Texas lender's constructive trust claim against a Ne-
vada-based inventor for loan proceeds received from Texas investors.45
2. The Texas Long Arm in Non-Commercial Tort Cases
Religious Technology Center v. Liebreich46 is the attempted Texas en-
forcement of a Florida contract partially settling a tort claim. The case
began in 1997 as a Florida wrongful death claim against several corporate
and individual defendants affiliated with the Church of Scientology, aris-
ing out of Lisa McPherson's death. Early in the Florida action, McPher-
son's estate entered an agreement with Florida defendant Flag Service
Organization ("Flag") to limit the number of Scientology-related defend-
ants in return for Flag's agreement not to encumber its assets. In 1999,
McPherson's estate apparently violated the agreement in attempting to
add Scientologist leader David Miscavige as a Florida defendant. After
the Miscavige claim's dismissal in Florida, the Religious Technology
Center ("RTC")-a Scientology-affiliated company chaired by Mis-
cavige-brought this action in the Eastern District of Texas against Mc-
Pherson's estate and its personal representative, Dell Liebrich. The
Texas action alleged breach of contract against the estate and tortious
interference with contract against Liebrich, in her personal capacity.
RTC claimed third-party standing to enforce the estate's agreement with
Flag not to add additional parties. The district court dismissed the tor-
tious interference claim against Liebrich personally, but the case went to
trial against the estate on the theory that Liebrich's Texas residency sub-
jected the estate to general jurisdiction here. The jury found for RTC on
the contract claim and awarded $258,697.10, to which the court added
$327,654.00 in attorney fees. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that the
district court had impermissibly imputed Liebrich's general jurisdiction
(on the personal claim against her) to the estate, a Florida-based entity.
The Fifth Circuit also rejected RTC's argument of specific jurisdiction be-
cause Liebrich's related activities either occurred in Florida or were di-
41. Delta Brands, Inc. v. Danieli Corp., No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-0081-N, 2002 WL
31875560 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2002) (not designated for publication).
42. Budgget [sic] Indus., Inc. v. Faber Eng'g, L.L.C., No. 14-02-01076-CV, 2003 WL
21087138 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 15, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
43. PET Ja, S.A. v. Shell Compafiia Argentina de Petroleo, S.A., No. 01-02-00661-CV,
2003 WL 854163 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2003, pet. denied) (mem.
opinion).
44. Gustafson v. Provider Healthnet Services, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 479 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003), reh'g overruled (Nov. 6, 2003).
45. Yfantis v. Balloun, 115 S.W.3d 175 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
46. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Liebreich, 339 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2003).
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rected to the Florida lawsuit.47
In rejecting Texas jurisdiction for claims of sexual assault in Missouri,
the Dallas court of appeals skipped the contacts analysis and went di-
rectly to the fair play and substantial justice test.
48
Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis49 involves the claims
of several Missouri residents for sexual assault by a priest in St. Louis
who had been reassigned there from Dallas. Plaintiffs named the priest
and both the St. Louis and Dallas archdioceses as defendants. The trial
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed,
noting that even if the St. Louis diocese had contacts in Texas, the fair
play and substantial justice balancing tests weighed heavily against the
Texas forum. Specifically, the assaults occurred in Missouri, the victims
were all from Missouri, the witnesses where there, and Texas had a rela-
tively lower interest in resolving the dispute than did a Missouri court.
50
In an attorney malpractice case, the San Antonio court of appeals ap-
pears to have ruled on the merits, without the need of a jury, in its find-
ing of no jurisdiction over a Louisiana attorney.5 1 Texas resident Karen
French was shot and rendered quadriplegic in a robbery attempt outside a
parking garage in New Orleans. She hired Austin attorney Dicky Grigg,
who in turn hired Louisiana attorney Vincent Glorioso to represent her in
a Louisiana lawsuit, which settled in mediation. French was covered by
her employee group plan at the time of the injury, but sought Medicaid
benefits when the employee coverage ended. She then learned that she
had waived her Medicaid claim by depositing the settlement proceeds in
Glorioso's client trust account instead of immediately placing them in a
special needs trust. French then sued Grigg and Glorioso, whose objec-
tion to Texas jurisdiction was sustained. In affirming the trial court's dis-
missal, the court of appeals made what it characterized as jurisdictional
fact findings, which included a finding that Glorioso had not misadvised
French about her benefits. The court explained that "ultimate liability in
tort is not a jurisdictional fact, although in some cases it may be."152 With
that "jurisdictional fact" decided against her, plaintiff had failed to estab-
lish the basis for Texas jurisdiction.
In re El Paso Apparel Group, Inc.53 held a New York accounting firm
amenable to Texas jurisdiction for its alleged negligence in facilitating an
El Paso firm executive's asset depletion. El Paso Apparel Group's
("EPAG") 2001 bankruptcy included an adversary proceeding against
Mark Lederman, EPAG's president, chief executive officer and control-
47. Id. at 375-76.
48. Id.
49. Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis ex rel Rigali, 109 S.W.3d 928
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.).
50. Id. at 931.
51. French v. Glorioso, 94 S.W.3d 739 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.).
52. Id. at 746 (citing Arterbury v. Am. Bank & Trust Co., 553 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, no writ)).
53. In re El Paso Apparel Group, Inc., 288 B.R. 757 (W.D. Tex. 2003).
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ling shareholder, also naming New York accounting firm Konigsberg
Wolf & Company. Konigsberg's objection that it performed its work in
New York persuaded the bankruptcy judge to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion, but the district court reversed, noting the well-settled precedent that
"non-resident professionals who purposefully avail themselves of the laws
of business opportunities of another state" may be subject to jurisdiction
there.5
4
Hitachi Shin Din Cable, Ltd. v. Cain55 involved problems that can oc-
cur when the defendants' identities are unclear. It was a products liabil-
ity claim for a defective clock radio that caught fire and damaged
plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs sued Wal-Mart and various manufacturers, in-
cluding Hitachi Shin Din, a Hong Kong plug manufacturer unrelated to
the large Japanese manufacturer Hitachi. Because the fire destroyed the
radio, it was impossible to identify the radio's origin; thus when plaintiffs
could not establish with any certainty where they bought the radio, Wal-
Mart had to be dropped and plaintiffs had to argue extraterritorial juris-
diction against a few parts manufacturers, but not against the radio's
manufacturer or seller, both of whom would no doubt be amenable in
Texas. 56 Those arguments-based on products shipments and internet
presence-succeeded in the trial court but failed on appeal.5
7
Agency theory can establish personal jurisdiction in tort cases as well,
and did over a Missouri company in Long v. Grafton Executive Search,
L.L.C.58 Terry Ann Long had been employed as a vice president and
salesperson for two years with Grafton Executive Search, LLC, and Graf-
ton, Inc., both Missouri entities with offices there and in Kansas. When
Long moved to Texas, she used Grafton as a reference, but sued for defa-
mation when Grafton president Richard Carroll sent email and telephone
communications to Texas stating that Long intended to steal the new em-
ployers' customer lists, had honesty and integrity problems, and other dis-
paraging comments. Although this assertion of specific jurisdiction is
unremarkable, its detailing of contacts and supporting precedents provide
a good model for defamation jurisdiction. 59
Exito Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Trejo60 is a reminder of the need to heed
detail when entering a special appearance for a nonresident defendant.
Exito is the Taiwanese manufacturer of an allegedly defective cord that
caused a fire leading to three deaths. When Exito was added to the law-
suit, it filed a Rule 11 agreement extending time to answer before con-
54. Id. at 764.
55. Hitachi Shin Din Cable, Ltd. v. Cain, 106 S.W.3d 776 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003,
no pet.).
56. Telephone conversation with Hitachi Shin Din's attorney, Susan Hays, November
26, 2003.
57. Id. at 781-88.
58. Long v. Grafton Executive Search, L.L.C., 263 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
59. Id. at 1087-90.




testing jurisdiction, and thereby waived it objection.61
Two unreported cases this year demonstrate the extremes to which ju-
risdictional facts can reach, and the resulting inconsistent decisions. The
first case holds that advertising in the local yellow pages does not neces-
sarily subject a nonresident business to Texas jurisdiction, at least accord-
ing to the Austin Court of Appeals. In Malik v. A Briggs Passport & Visa
Expeditors,62 Austin-resident Malik sought visas for a Christmas holiday
trip to Pakistan. Thinking that special help would be needed for the holi-
day rush, Malik looked in the Austin yellow pages and chose the listing
for Briggs Passport & Visa Expeditors and called the 800 number listed
there. Malik alleged that because of Briggs's inaction and misrepresenta-
tions their visas arrived too late, causing the Malik family to miss part of
the vacation and incur additional expenses. When Malik sued in Austin,
Briggs entered a special appearance and denied doing business in Texas.
The trial court granted the jurisdictional objections and the court of ap-
peals affirmed, finding that Malik's jurisdictional allegations were too
meager to support Texas jurisdiction. The court's discussion emphasizes
that Malik needed more definitive allegations as to the substance of de-
fendant's wrongful acts in Texas, and that mere allegations of (1) plaintiff
responding to a local yellow pages advertisement, (2) ordering a product
by phone, and (3) thereafter suffering from defendant's breach and re-
lated misinformation, are insufficient. 63
Charles R. Weber Co., Inc. v. Back-Haul Bulk Carriers, Inc. is the oppo-
site extreme, with Houston's Fourteenth Court of Appeals finding Texas
jurisdiction-both specific and general-over a Connecticut-based cargo
broker for breach of contract and deceptive-trade-practice claims relating
to the delivering of crude oil from Oman to Singapore.64 For specific
jurisdiction, defendant's Texas contacts were telephone calls and
telefaxes, for which the court noted: "This court has consistently held that
even a single telephone call, during which a misrepresentation was di-
rected into Texas and relied on in Texas, satisfies the 'minimum contacts'
prong of the jurisdictional analysis under specific jurisdiction. ' 65 Al-
though jurisdictional analyses necessarily turn on facts and vary from case
to case, these two holdings seem at odds. Malik involved a service to be
rendered to consumers in Austin, while Weber arose from a contract to be
performed half a world away.
In other decisions, Texas courts found general jurisdiction over a New
Jersey manufacturer for an employee's asbestosis claim, based on the
company's Texas activities since the 1950s, including sales and product
61. Id. at 368-70.
62. Malik v. A Briggs Passport & Visa Expeditors, No. 03-02-00511-CV, 2003 WL
549258 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 27, 2003, no pet.) (mrnem. opinion).
63. Id. at *1-5.
64. Charles R. Weber Co., Inc. v. Back-Haul Bulk Carriers, Inc., No. 14-02-00240-CV,
2002 WL 31769418 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 12, 2002, no pet.) (not desig-
nated for publication).
65. Id. at *3.
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testing unrelated to plaintiff's claim;66 found specific jurisdiction over a
Mexican recording company for a car crash in Mexico killing several
Texas residents, where the defendant had sent a car from Mexico to pick
up the decedents in Texas and transport them to Mexico;67 found specific
jurisdiction over a Wyoming communications corporation for failure to
pay a Texas company for brokerage services;68 and found specific jurisdic-
tion over three residents of Mexico who transported their eighty-eight
year-old father (a Texas resident) to Mexico against his wife's wishes for
the alleged purpose of controlling inheritance issues.69 Texas courts
found no jurisdiction for (1) a defendant's contribution impleader against
a Missouri physician who had treated the plaintiff (also a Missouri resi-
dent);70 (2) three Texas harvesters' claims against nonresident growers for
work to be performed in Colorado and Kansas;71 (3) a claim against a
Kentucky accident investigation company regarding an automobile acci-
dent there;72 and a slip and fall claim arising in Las Vegas and argued
under general jurisdiction and internet presence, explained below in the
internet section.
73
3. Long Arms in Federal Question Cases
Federal courts ordinarily use the long arm statute of the state in which
they're located, but in a few instances use a federal long arm statute.
a. Texas contacts-federal question cases applying the Texas long
arm
Most claims arising under federal law lack an accompanying federal
long arm statute and are limited to the forum state's jurisdictional reach.
Because Texas extends its long arm to the full reach of due process, fed-
eral question defendants are amenable if they satisfy any of the Texas
long arms. The most interesting example this year is Flores v. A.C., Inc.,
an action by Texas residents under federal migrant and labor laws and
related state laws. 74 Plaintiffs allege they were recruited from west Texas
66. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Kwasnik, 109 S.W.3d 21 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no
pet.).
67. EMI Music Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. Rodriguez, 97 S.W.3d 847 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.).
68. Mountain States Radio, Inc. v. Star Media Group, Inc., No. 05-02-00844-CV, 2002
WL 31411065 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 28, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
69. Quintanilla v. Verges, No. 04-03-00099-CV, 2003 WL 21216487 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio May 28, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
70. Sealift, Inc. v. Satterly, No. 14-03-00051-CV, 2003 WL 21664672 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] July 17, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
71. Ramon v. Jensen, No. 04-02-00682-CV, 2003 WL 1232996 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio Mar. 19, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
72. Coleman v. Cecil, No. 05-02-01129-CV, 2003 WL 187434 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan.
29, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
73. Arriaga v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
74. Flores v. A.C., Inc., No. EP-02-CA-0200-DB, 2003 WL 1566507 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 5,
2003) (mem. opinion). Plaintiffs sued under the Agricultural Workers Protection Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq. and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., and
under the Maine state wage payment laws. Id. at *1.
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to work in Maine processing sea cucumbers, with promises that (1) they
could choose between piece rate and hourly rate pay, (2) if they wished,
they could instead work clearing pine trees, and (3) they would have a
certain quality of food and housing. Plaintiffs claimed that these
promises were ignored when they arrived in Maine and that they had to
work at substantially lower wages than promised, ride in substandard
transportation and live in substandard housing. Defendants included two
Maine companies, A.C., Inc., and Country Concrete and Construction
Company, Inc., who both used Francisco Velez to recruit the Texas work-
ers. This allowed the Maine defendants to object to personal jurisdiction
based on their own lack of contact with Texas. The court sustained their
objections and found that Velez did not qualify as an agent whose Texas
contacts could be imputed to defendants, and accordingly dismissed the
claims against them. The ruling here stands in sharp contrast to one from
last year's Survey-Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk Train, Inc.75-in which the
sdme federal district found specific jurisdiction over a New York com-
pany for similar violations, committed against similar plaintiffs recruited
in a similar fashion from the El Paso area.
Federal courts found personal jurisdiction over an Oklahoma sole pro-
prietor dealing in used school buses who allegedly infringed on an Illinois
manufacturer's trademark by marketing under the name "International"
in certain Texas markets,76 and no jurisdiction in a trademark infringe-
ment claim by Texas-based MADD against New York-based
DAMMADD. 77
b. Nationwide contacts-federal question cases applying a federal
long arm
Rule 4(k)(1) allows for a nationwide contacts analysis for enumerated
cases, and 4(k)(2) for foreign defendants not otherwise subject to the ju-
risdictional reach of any one state. In these cases sufficient contacts are
assessed with the United States as a whole rather than any one state.78 In
Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group, PLC,79 the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's determination that English-based Sage Group was not
subject to 4(k)(2) jurisdiction for trademark infringement. In 1995, plain-
tiff Quick Technologies (of indeterminate origin in the opinion) sought to
register the mark "Sage Information System" with the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office. Quick's application met opposition from Sage
Group, an English company with two American subsidiaries, Sage U.S.
Holdings, Inc., and Sage Software, Inc. When negotiations broke down
between the two claimants in 1999, each sued the other and the actions
75. Gonsalez Moreno v. Milk Train, 182 F. Supp. 2d 590 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
76. International Truck & Engine Corp. v. Quintana, 259 F. Supp. 2d 553 (N.D. Tex.
2003).
77. Mothers Against Drunk Driving v. DAMMADD, Inc., No. CIV.A.302CV1712G,
2003 WL 292162 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2003) (mem. opinion).
78. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), 28 U.S.C. at 32 (2000).
79. Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group, PLC, 313 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2003).
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were consolidated. The district court dismissed the English parent, and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's arguments of U.S. contacts
related to its trademark applications and its maintenance of a passive
website. 80
4. Internet Jurisdiction
Three Survey period cases rejected internet arguments as a basis for
personal jurisdiction in Texas. One of the most newsworthy jurisdiction
cases involves a defamation claim arising from the Pan Am Flight 103
crash over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988.81 Harvard pathologist Hart G.W.
Lidov wrote an article on the terrorist attack in which he alleged the Rea-
gan administration's willful ignoring of repeated early warnings of the
terrorist attack, all done for political purposes. The allegations included a
cover-up by the FBI's then-Associate Deputy Director, Oliver "Buck"
Revell, and included an accusation that Revell knew of the attack in ad-
vance and made certain that his son, originally booked on the flight,
changed planes. Lidov posted his article on Columbia University's jour-
nalism web site where it was available for anyone to read. At the time
Lidov posted the article, he was unaware that Revell had moved to Texas.
Revell filed his defamation suit against Lidov and Columbia University in
a Dallas federal court and defendants challenged personal jurisdiction.
The district court sustained the jurisdictional objections and the Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed in an opinion exploring both the old and
new boundaries of defamation jurisdiction. In particular, the court found
that "one cannot purposefully avail oneself of 'some forum someplace;'
rather, as the Supreme Court has stated, due process requires that 'the
defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there."' 82 Because
Lidov and Columbia published the article unaware of Revell's Texas resi-
dence, and because the article did not refer to any events in Texas, there
was no basis for general or specific jurisdiction. 83
In Arriaga v. Imperial Palace, Inc.,84 a Texas resident slipped and fell in
a Las Vegas hotel, returned to Texas for medical treatment and sued the
hotel here. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction-specific jurisdic-
tion was not at issue because the accident occurred in Nevada, and plain-
tiff's general jurisdiction argument, based on the hotel's use of the
internet for advertising and guest registration, was insufficient. In partic-
ular, plaintiff failed to allege that she made an online reservation, and the
hotel established that she had checked in under another guest's reserva-
tion. The court nonetheless applied the Fifth Circuit's sliding scale test
for internet presence, noting that no Fifth Circuit court had yet analyzed
80. Id.
81. Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002).
82. Id. at 475 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985)).
83. Id. at 468-76.
84. Arriaga v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d 380 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
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an internet hotel reservation system for jurisdictional purposes, and em-
phasizing the test's ill-suitedness for measuring general jurisdiction.
85
The court found that Imperial's web site was not targeted to Texas and
accounted for too few Texas registrations to establish jurisdiction, follow-
ing a federal decision from Missouri involving the same defendant and
the same facts.
86
Quick Technologies, discussed immediately above, also rejected plain-
tiff's argument that the English defendant's website was a sufficient con-
tact for personal jurisdiction in a trademark claim.
87
5. Status Jurisdiction
Status jurisdiction is a special category recognizing a state's authority
to adjudicate issues such as marital status, parental custody and mental
competence. It is often characterized as subject matter jurisdiction but
turns on amenability factors such as contacts with the forum state. Com-
petence determinations do not often implicate interstate issues, and mari-
tal status litigation still tends to tolerate parallel suits in different states
and countries. The pervasive problem exists with child custody determi-
nations-both original and modifications-where conflicting judgments
and parental abduction create problems. The solution has been legisla-
tion in the form of uniform acts or treaties designed to choose a single
custody forum that other states will respect. Domestically, the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 88 and the
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act89 seek to establish unitary
child custody jurisdiction and apply full faith and credit to those deci-
sions. Internationally, the UCCJEA governs both jurisdictional disputes
and decree enforcement, 90 and is joined by the International Child Ab-
duction Remedies Act 91 ("ICARA," the United States version of the
Hague Convention on Child Abduction 92), which seeks the return of chil-
dren taken both within the United States and across international borders
in violation of valid custody orders. These Acts often involve judgment
enforcement and preclusion, but are discussed here because they also in-
volve questions of status jurisdiction.
85. Id. at 385 & n.4. The sliding scale test is commonly known as the Zippo test from
Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), incorporated
in Fifth Circuit precedent by Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC, 190 F.3d 333 (5th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 384-87 (citing Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d
1082 (E.D. Mo. 2001)); see also, Reiff v. Roy, 115 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet.
denied) (reaching the same conclusion in a similar claim against a Colorado hotel).
87. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
88. TEX. FAM. COD. ANN. §§ 152.101-152.317 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.105 (Vernon Supp. 2002). The PKPA does not apply
to child custody conflicts with foreign countries.
91. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (1995 & Supp. 2002).
92. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, opened
for signature Oct. 25, 1980, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 (1980) (entered into force Dec. 1, 1983).
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a. Interstate custody disputes
Two Survey period cases involved interstate custody and related dis-
putes. In re Oates93 denied custody jurisdiction for grandparent access
after the mother's move to New York. Janet and Sammy Oates met and
married in Odessa, Texas, and filed for divorce there in July, 2000. The
court appointed both parents joint managing conservator of their three
children, but gave Sammy primary possession while Janet relocated to
New York. When Sammy died in January, 2001, Janet agreed to leave the
children in Texas with both sets of grandparents until she found a suitable
residence in New York. The children then moved to New York to live
with her in April, 2001. In August, 2001, Sammy's parents sued for his
insurance benefits (on a policy naming Janet as beneficiary), and three
weeks later amended to ask for grandparent access. Janet contested the
trial court's custody jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, and filed this man-
damus action when the court rejected her argument. The court of appeals
granted mandamus, finding that Texas lacked home state jurisdiction (be-
cause the children had already located to New York four months before
the grandparents filed their suit), and further lacked significant connec-
tion jurisdiction because the children now lived with a parent in another
state.94 Janet had also challenged the Texas UCCJEA's constitutionality
in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Troxel v. Granville,95 but the
argument was unnecessary in light of the court's granting her request on
nonconstitutional grounds.
Texas courts also (1) approved the ceding of child custody jurisdiction
to a Colorado court based on the children's having lived there with the
mother for almost three years;96 and (2) held that although the UCCJEA
barred the biological parents' Texas bill of review to set aside adoption
proceedings that placed their child in a Virginia home, that the UCCJEA
did not affect Texas litigation of the parents' fraud action against the
adoption agency's attorney.
97
b. International custody disputes
In re Vernor98 highlights the special difficulties inherent in an interna-
tional custody dispute. The mother, Jude Vernor, is an Australian who
was living in Round Rock, Texas, in 1994 when she became romantically
involved with the father, Texas resident Larry Carden. The parties had a
child in July, 1995, but never married, and Ms. Vernor was the child's only
93. In re Oates, 104 S.W.3d 571 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.).
94. Id. at 574-78.
95. Id. at 574 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
96. In re C.C.B. & M.J.B., No. 08-01-00353-CV, 2002 WL 31727247 (Tex. App.-El
Paso Dec. 5, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Deference to the Colorado
court was authorized by Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 152.202 (Vernon 2000).
97. In re B.G.A., No. 04-02-00315-CV, 2003 WL 1712517 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
Apr. 2, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).




caregiver. The opinion recites that Mr. Carden visited the child "infor-
mally" during the parties' "sporadic and stormy relationship." Mr.
Carden filed a paternity action in November, 1995, resulting in temporary
orders naming Vernor and Carden joint managing conservators and re-
stricting the child's residence to Texas. But Carden abandoned that case
and it was dismissed in 1998 for want of prosecution.99
The stormy relationship is reflected in the parties' reciprocal allega-
tions. Carden was apparently violent and attended anger-management
counseling, and Carden in turn reported Vernor to Child Protective Ser-
vices several times. Vernor alleges that these were false reports that
never resulted in state action, and the court of appeals apparently
agreed. 100 A particularly violent episode occurred in April, 2001, when
Carden struck Vernor in front of the then-six-year-old child, who at-
tempted to protect his mother as Carden dragged her to his car. Vernor
moved into a women's shelter and applied for a protective order in Wil-
liamson County, which was denied. Carden then tried to take the child
from his school, and in response, Vernor first moved him to another
school and then fled to a shelter in New Mexico. Carden learned of her
new residence and sought help from the New Mexico police, and Vernor
then left with the child to return to her parents in Australia. 10 1 In the
meantime, Carden had filed a second paternity action in Williamson
County, obtaining a default judgment on the same day Vernor left for
Australia without legal or actual knowledge of the new lawsuit. Now
aware of her move to Australia, Carden sought the child's return under
the Hague Convention with false allegations of custody rights under the
dismissed 1995 joint custody order. Unaware of this fraud, the Australian
court ordered an investigation, further ordered Vernor not to relocate the
child pending further Hague Convention proceedings, and later stayed its
action in deference to Carden's action in Williamson County.
102
With the legal proceedings now returned to Texas, Vernor appeared at
two evidentiary hearings. She lost and was ordered to return the child to
Texas, in spite of proof that (1) her move to Australia did not violate any
valid custody orders; (2) Carden had lied in his Hague Convention appli-
cation; (3) her immigration status was now compromised; and (4) perhaps
most pointedly, her fears of Carden's violence. 10 3 The Austin Court of
Appeals, with due deference to the inherent difficulty for trial courts
faced with these issues, nonetheless found little good to say about the
trial court's conclusions. In particular, the court of appeals noted repeat-
edly Carden's having based this entire action on a dismissed 1995 tempo-
rary custody order and an invalid 2001 action. In a classic instance of
bootstrap logic, the dispute's only facially valid custody order was the one
currently under review, issued more than a year after Vernor and the
99. Id. at 203.
100. Id. at 203-04.
101. Id. at 204.
102. Id. at 204-06.
103. Id. at 206-07.
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child moved to Australia. The court of appeals found further fault in the
trial court's failure to take other factors into account, such as the child's
current well-being in Australia and Vernor's financial burden in returning
to Texas, not to mention her immigration status. The court granted the
writ of mandamus with instructions to reconsider based on the concerns
addressed.104
C. REASONS FOR DECLINING OTHERWISE VALID JURISDICTION
Even where all jurisdictional elements exist, courts may refrain from
litigating cases involving a sovereign foreign government, cases contractu-
ally directed at other forums, cases in which convenience dictates another
forum, and cases parallel for other litigation.
1. Sovereign Immunity
The Survey period's only action involving a foreign sovereign is Elixir
Shipping, Ltd. v. Perushahann Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara,0 5 a Maltese plaintiff's suit against an Indonesian-owned corpo-
ration for a ship collision in Indonesian waters. The Southern District of
Texas found that the defendant was in fact a government instrumentality,
but that its commercial activity lacked a sufficient nexus to the United
States to invoke personal jurisdiction (or the subject matter jurisdiction
of United States courts) under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.10 6
2. Derogating Forum Selection Clauses
The Consent section above discusses forum selection clauses that estab-
lish local jurisdiction. 10 7 Somewhat different considerations arise when
the plaintiff sues in a forum contrary to the parties' earlier choice in a
forum selection clause. These are known as derogation clauses (in regard
to that forum), and instead of justifying the court's retention of the case,
require the court to consider declining its otherwise valid jurisdiction
over the parties.
In My Caf6-CCC, Ltd. v. Lunchstop, Inc.,10 8 the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals enforced a franchise clause designating California for litigation, re-
lying on a UCC provision governing choice of law clauses and arguably
irrelevant to choice of forum clauses. My Cafd is a Texas limited partner-
ship with its principal place of business here. It entered four franchise
agreements with California-based Lunchstop, each of which was accom-
104. Id. at 207-12. In an attached Supplemental Opinion, the court of appeals over-
ruled the trial judge's motion for rehearing, finding that the judge's arguments "pertain
more to the permanent custody decision to be reached in this cause than to the appropri-
ateness of the temporary orders .... Id. at 212-13.
105. Elixir Shipping, Ltd. v. Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 267 F.
Supp. 2d 659 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
106. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2000); see Elixir Shipping, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 662-67.
107. See supra notes 20-29, especially the sources cited in note 20.




panied by a "Franchise Offering Circular" designating in capital letters
that resulting lawsuits had to be filed in San Francisco, California, and
each of which restated that in the contract. My Caf6 objected to the
clause with arguments of noncompliance with Texas Business and Com-
merce Code Section 35.53 (requiring bold print for forum clauses in cer-
tain contracts),10 9 and fraudulent inducement which would negate the
forum clause.' 10 My Caf6's two fraud arguments also failed. The first-
based on the fact that the various clauses were not identical-failed for
not alleging the elements of fraud. The second- allegations that Lunch-
stop misrepresented profitability-went to the merits of the case, not to
the forum issue. The court accordingly affirmed the trial court's
dismissal.11'
In a simpler application of derogation clause principles, the federal
court in Galveston enforced a forum clause in plaintiff's employment
contract and transferred his personal injury claim to the Western District
of Louisiana, finding the clause to be mandatory and thus creating an
exclusive forum there. 112
3. Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals
Forum non conveniens, or inconvenient forum, is an old common law
objection to jurisdiction that now is also available by statutes such as 28
U.S.C. § 1404 for intra-jurisdictional transfers based on convenience. 113
Because intra-federal transfers under § 1404 do not implicate conflicts be-
tween states or nations, they are not considered here. This article is lim-
109. Id. at 864-65.
110. The court of appeals held that My Caf's argument failed because Section 35.53
expressly excludes contracts governed by Texas Business and Commerce Code Section
1.105, as was this franchise contract. Although the court's reasoning logically flows
through Section 35.53 and Section 1.105, the court's statement that Section 1.105 "confers
upon parties to a multistate transaction the right to choose their own law" goes too far to
the extent that it includes non-UCC contracts. Id. at 865 (citing 1.105 cmt. 1 (Vernon
1994)). That is, Section 1.105 does not apply in any way to non-UCC transactions, and
more importantly, does not apply to choice of forum clauses. The United States Supreme
Court has clarified that choice of law and choice of forum are two different functions,
neither determinative of the other. See e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
481-82 (1985). The contract at issue here was a franchise agreement, ordinarily not gov-
erned by the UCC. The contract clause at issue here was a choice of forum clause, which is
not addressed by Section 1.105. Nevertheless, because of Section 35.53's odd invocation of
Section 1.105, and in cases in which a non-UCC contract involves some transaction in
goods (as franchise agreements often do, and apparently was argued here), a choice of
forum clause can be governed by a UCC provision never intended to be applied. The
result in this case is not all that untenable because the parties' choice of a California forum
(defendant Lunchstop's homestate) is reasonable. Further problems with these statutes
may be moot because Texas has just repealed the former Section 1.105 on September 1,
2003, although the current Section 35.53 does not reflect that repeal and still refers to
Section 1.105.
111. Id. at 862-67.
112. Speed v. Omega Protein, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2000) is the federal statutory provision for inconvenient forum
objections seeking transfer to another federal court. Texas law provides for in-state venue




ited to inter-jurisdictional forum non conveniens under the common law,
available in state and federal courts in Texas under the same two-part test
requiring movant to show the availability of an adequate alternative fo-
rum, and that a balancing of private and public interests favors trans-
fer.1 14 It also includes one noteworthy Texas statutory forum non
conveniens case.
The Survey period produced four noteworthy forum non conveniens
decisions. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.1 15 was a wrongful death
action (or series of actions) for a single-vehicle crash in the state of
Nuevo Leon, Mexico, that killed six passengers. The victims' family
members sued Bridgestone, General Motors and other defendants for al-
leged product defects, while defendants alleged improper maintenance
and driver negligence. Plaintiffs' first lawsuit in federal court in Browns-
ville, Texas ("Vasquez I"), was dismissed for lack of diversity, and plain-
tiffs refiled in state court in Orange County ("Vasquez H"). Defendants
removed Vasquez H to federal court in Beaumont, which granted a forum
non conveniens dismissal for re-filing in Mexico, which included a deter-
mination that Mexico's law should govern. The federal court then dis-
missed with prejudice to prevent re-filing and did not impose a "return
jurisdiction clause" that would allow plaintiffs the Beaumont forum if de-
fendants did not consent to litigation in Mexico. Plaintiffs did not accept
this and filed Vasquez III in Cameron County, Texas, which was removed
to federal court and dismissed by stipulation. Plaintiffs then filed Vas-
quez IV in Webb County, Texas, naming five new defendants (including
the vehicle's driver) and two new plaintiffs. Defendants removed Vas-
quez IV to federal court, whereupon the federal court in Vasquez H is-
sued a sua sponte temporary restraining order barring plaintiffs and their
attorneys from arguing their pending remand motion or from filing new
suits; this later became a permanent injunction, meant to protect the fi-
nality of Vasquez H's forum non conveniens dismissal. Plaintiffs appealed
114. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235 (1981); McLennan v. American Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403, 423-24 (5th
Cir. 2001). The private factors look to the parties' convenience and include the relative
ease of access to sources of proof; the availability of compulsory process for the attendance
of unwilling witnesses; the cost of obtaining their attendance; the possibility of viewing the
premises (if appropriate); and all other practical problems that make the trial easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive. The public factors look to the courts' concerns and the forum state's
interests, and include the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the lo-
cal interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the interest in having the
trial of a diversity case in a forum familiar with the law that must govern the action; the
avoidance of unnecessary conflict of laws problems; and the unfairness of burdening citi-
zens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. See McLennan, 245 F.3d at 423. Texas forum
non conveniens law is multi-faceted. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051
(Vernon Supp. 2003) applies to personal injury and wrongful death claims. TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.052 (Vernon Supp. 2003) applies to asbestosis claims filed
by persons not residing in Texas at the time their claims arose. Common law forum non
conveniens, in line with Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, governs all other interstate and international
forum convenience issues in Texas state courts. See In re Smith Barney, Inc., 975 S.W.2d
593, 596 (Tex. 1998).
115. Vasques v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2003).
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the dismissal of Vasquez H and the permanent injunction. 116
The Fifth Circuit agreed that Mexico was the proper forum. Plaintiffs'
multifaceted argument included the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, which, plaintiffs argued, gave Mexico's citizens the same
position before Texas courts as American citizens.117 The Fifth Circuit
rejected this, citing precedent allowing for forum non conveniens dismis-
sals in the face of treaty obligations.118 The Fifth Circuit also found that
in spite of the tire manufacturing's evidence being located in the United
States, that far more of the pertinent evidence was in Mexico.119 In its
final point favoring the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit found that Mexico's
law indeed was the better choice under Restatement (Second) of the
Conflict of Laws Sections 6 and 145, specifically noting the best possible
accommodation of both nations' policies and the need for uniformity and
predictability. Although the court upheld the forum non conveniens dis-
missal, it reversed on two other points. First, the district court's dismissal
lacked the important return-jurisdiction clause, and second, a forum non
conveniens dismissal is not on the merits and did not justify a permanent
injunction against further suits.
120
In re DuPontl21 is an important Texas Supreme Court ruling interpret-
ing Texas's statutory forum non conveniens law for asbestosis claims filed
by foreign plaintiffs. Specifically, it determined when the statute applies
to trigger the election to file elsewhere or to take a lower remedy in Texas
courts. The action involved more than 8,000 plaintiffs from five related
cases in Orange and Jefferson counties, pending against eighty defend-
ants. DuPont moved to dismiss under the Texas statutory requirement
that certain asbestosis claims filed by non-Texas residents on or after Au-
gust 1, 1995 but before January 1, 1997, include an election to abate pend-
ing re-filing in another state, or an acceptance of lower damages. 122
DuPont argued that the statute applied here, based on some plaintiffs'
prior filings against other defendants, but not against DuPont. The court
disagreed, making a first-impression decision that the triggering date is
when DuPont was first named as a party, not when the claim was initially
filed against other defendants. The supreme court further held that stat-
ute did apply to these facts, but that plaintiffs should now have a chance
to make election and remanded for that purpose.123
116. Id. at 670-71.
117. Id. at 672, n.6 (citing Int'l Covenant on Civil and Politial Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
14(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171).
118. Id. at 672.
119. Id. at 672-74.
120. Id. at 675-81.
121. In re E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 92 S.W.3d 517 (Tex. 2002).
122. Id. at 520 n.3 (citing Act of May 29, 1997, 75th Leg., ch. 424, § 2, 1997 Tex. Gen.
Laws 1680, 1682-83 repealed by Act of June 11, 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 204, § 3.09, 2003 Tex.
Gen. Laws 847, 855 (formerly codified as TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.052)).
123. Id. at 525-26.
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In Delta Brands, Inc. v. Danieli Corporation,124 the Texas plaintiff com-
peted with Danieli to become contractor on a project to supply steel
processing equipment to a Swedish company, SSAB Tunnplat, A.B. A
confidentiality agreement accompanied Delta's bid submission, covering
confidential and proprietary information relating to Delta's equipment.
When Danieli got the bid, Delta brought claims in a Dallas federal court
that SSAB and Danieli had conspired to acquire and use Delta's trade
secrets. Defendants filed forum objections, and when the court found no
personal jurisdiction over the Swedish defendant, it was a logical follow
up to dismiss the claim against Danieli on forum non conveniens grounds,
based not only on the Swedish location of the underlying incident, but on
the Swedish defendant's unavailability in Texas. 125
Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., discussed at length in the
choice of law section, is a routine forum non conveniens analysis regard-
ing an air crash in Mexico, with novel twists in the intersection of choice
of law with fraudulent joinder and federal subject matter jurisdiction.
126
Plaintiff's attorneys should also note the court's delaying dismissal to al-
low extra time for service on additional defendants so as to bind them to
the terms of the forum non conveniens dismissal.
12 7
Cases published late in the Survey period include Acadian Geophysical
Services, Inc. v. Cameron, an employee action for unpaid merger pro-
ceeds in which the Waco Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's denial
of forum non conveniens, even though the action arose in Louisiana, was
governed by its law, all defendants were amenable to Louisiana process
and all witnesses were from Louisiana; 128 and Jones v. Raytheon Aircraft
Services, Inc., a case resembling Zermeno in which the court of appeals




Parallel litigation is difficult to define, sometimes meaning identical
lawsuits with exactly the same parties bringing the same claims, and
sometimes meaning two or more lawsuits that may result in claim preclu-
sion for some or all parties. It occurs both intra- and inter-jurisdiction-
ally, and involves remedies of transfer and consolidation (intra-
jurisdictional only), stay, dismissal, and anti-suit injunction, or in many
124. Delta Brands, Inc. v. Danieli Corp., No. CIV.A.3:02-CV-0081-N, 2002 WL
31875560 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 20, 2002).
125. Id. at *6-10.
126. Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Tex. 2003). See
infra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
127. Zermeno, 246 F. Supp. 2d at 665-68. This typically includes defendants' agreement
to submit themselves to the foreign jurisdiction.
128. Acadian Geophysical Serves., Inc. v. Cameron, 119 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. App.-Waco
2003, no pet.). The court based its decision on the Texas residence of some plaintiffs and
the fact of the defendant corporation's registration to do business in Texas. Id. at 305.




cases, allowing both cases to proceed and using the first-to-judgment to
preclude the other.130 This article will discuss only parallel litigation in-
volving at least one case outside of Texas; that is, it will not consider mul-
tiple related actions involving courts all located in Texas.
The Survey period produced two parallel litigation matters, one result-
ing in a stay of the Texas action, the other in an anti-suit injunction
against the foreign litigation. Crown Leasing Corp. v. Sims'3 ' involved
parallel actions in Florida and Texas over possession of Billy Sims's 1978
Heisman trophy. In 1995, Sims used his Heisman trophy and other sports
memorabilia as security for a $50,000 loan from Crown Leasing Corpora-
tion, which periodically allowed Sims to have temporary possession of the
trophy for signature shows. Sometime in 2000, Sims failed to return it
and instead sold an interest in the trophy to Scott Goodman, who soon
advertised his intention to sell the trophy in a telephone auction in Flor-
ida. The litigation began with Crown's lawsuit against Goodman and
Sims in Florida on December 4, 2000, seeking a temporary injunction
against the sale, which the court denied. Crown then filed a related claim
in Texas on December 7, 2000, seeking an ex parte sequestration order,
which the Texas court granted. Goodman then asked the Texas court to
abate its action pending the Florida outcome, and before the Texas court
could rule, Goodman filed a counterclaim in the Florida action. The
Texas court then abated its action. Crown's appeal of the Texas abate-
ment failed, based on the appellate court's findings that (1) Crown had
filed both lawsuits, Florida being first, (2) although the pertinent transac-
tions occurred in Texas, by the time of suit both Goodman and the trophy
were in Florida; and (3) Crown had pursued discovery in Florida.132 The
court of appeals did correct one aspect of the trial court's order by replac-
ing the abatement with a stay as the appropriate remedy. 133
London Market Insurers v. American Home Assurance Company134
upheld the issuance of an anti-suit injunction in an insurance coverage
dispute. The case began when Asarco, Inc. and related companies filed a
Texas declaratory judgment action regarding insurance coverage for as-
bestos claims at its industrial facilities in Texas. They sought coverage
from London Market Insurers, which followed up with a reactive declara-
tory judgment action in a New York state court. Asarco responded with a
motion for an anti-suit injunction from the Texas court, which it granted,
enjoining London Market Insurers from pursuing the New York action or
any other related action. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the
New York action was a threat to the Texas court's jurisdiction and could
130. See generally Parallel Litigation, supra note 20; James P. George, International Par-
allel Litigation-A Survey of Current Conventions and Model Laws, 37 TEX. INT'L L. J. 499
(2002).
131. Crown Leasing Corp. v. Sims, 92 S.W.3d 924 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no
pet.).
132. Id. at 926-28.
133. Id. at 928.
134. London Market Insurers v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 95 S.W.3d 702 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.).
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lead to an irreparable miscarriage of justice, two of the four grounds for
issuing anti-suit injunctions in Texas. 135 A well-reasoned dissent argued
that the standard had not been met and pointed out that the Texas Su-
preme Court had denied all three of its latest three considerations of anti-
suit injunctions.
136
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Choosing the applicable substantive law is a question, like personal ju-
risdiction and judgment enforcement, involving both forum law and con-
stitutional issues. Understanding these issues requires a clear focus on
basic principles. First, choice of law is a question of state law, both in
state and federal courts. 137 Second, it is a question of forum state law.
Renvoi-the practice of using another state's choice of law rule-is al-
most never employed unless the forum state directs it, and even there, the
forum state remains in control. 138 Third, the forum state has broad power
to make choice of law decisions, either legislatively or judicially, subject
only to limited constitutional requirements.
139
Within the forum state's control of choice of law is a hierarchy of
choice of law rules. At the top are legislative choice of law rules, that is,
statutes directing the application of certain state's laws, based on events
or people important to the operation of that specific law. 140 Second in the
135. Id. at 705-10. The four grounds are (1) threat to the court's jurisdiction; (2) to
prevent the evasion of important public policy; (3) to prevent a multiplicity of lawsuits; and
(4) to protect from vexatious or harassing lawsuits. Id. at 705-06; see Gannon v. Payne, 706
S.W.2d 304, 307 (Tex. 1986); Golden Rule Ins. Co. v. Harper, 925 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.
1996) (per curiam).
136. London Market Insurers, 95 SW.3d at 710-12 n.1 (referring to Gannon and Golden
Rule, supra note 134, and to Christensen v. Integrity Ins. Co., 719 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. 1986)).
137. See Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
138. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws creates a presumption against
renvoi except for limited circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 8. Although commentators defend renvoi's limited use, they acknowledge its gen-
eral lack of acceptance in the United States except in limited circumstances, usually found
in statutes directing the use of renvoi. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 5, at 67-72 (especially
68 n.4); WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 88-94. Texas law provides for renvoi in TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.105(b), 2.402(b), 4.509(a), 4.102(b), 8.106 & 9.103. For federal
courts, Klaxon reiterates the forum state's control of choice of law. Kiaxon, 313 U.S. at
497.
139. Similar to the due-process limitation on state long arm statutes, the United States
Constitution imposes limits on a state's ability to choose the governing law in its courts.
Unlike the limits on state long arm statutes (which arise only under the due process
clause), the choice of law limits arise under several doctrines-due process (requiring a
reasonable connection between the dispute and the governing law), full faith and credit
equal protection, privileges and immunities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause.
Constitutional problems most often occur when a state court chooses its own law in ques-
tionable circumstances. But the inappropriate choice of forum law is not the only conceiv-
able constitutional issue, and even when choosing foreign law, courts must apply choice of
law rules with an eye toward constitutional limitations.
140. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 6(1) and cmt. a. See, e.g., Owens Corning v. Carter,
997 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1999) (applying an earlier version of the Texas wrongful death stat-
ute, requiring that the court "apply the rules of substantive law that are appropriate to the
case." TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.031 (Vernon Supp. 2003) (as amended in 1997,
with the same wording as this provision).
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choice-of-law hierarchy is party-controlled choice of law, that is, choice of
law clauses in contracts that control unless public policy dictates other-
wise. 141 Third in the hierarchy is the common law, now controlled in
Texas by the most significant relationship test of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws.142 This Survey article is organized according to
this hierarchy, that is, statutory choice of law, followed by choice of law
clauses, and concluding with choice of law under the most significant rela-
tionship test. Special issues, such as constitutional limitations are dis-
cussed in the following section. This grouping results in a discussion that
mixes Texas Supreme Court opinions with those of Texas intermediate
appellate courts, federal district courts, and the Fifth Circuit. In spite of
this mix, readers should of course note that because choice of law is a
state law issue, that the only binding opinions are those of the Texas Su-
preme Court.
143
A. STATUTORY CHOICE OF LAW RULES
The Survey period offered one noteworthy case involving Texas choice
of law statutes. Citizens Insurance Company of America v. Hakim Dac-
cach144 was an interlocutory appeal of the certification of a class of de-
fendant Citizens Insurance's investors. In particular, Citizens Insurance
complained that the district court failed to engage in an adequate choice
of law analysis in finding that the application of Texas law created suffi-
cient commonality to justify class formation. 45 Citizens Insurance ar-
gued that the lower court's finding of commonality rested upon the
erroneous conclusion that Texas law applies to the sale of foreign life
141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 ("Law of the State Chosen
by the Parties") allows contracting parties to choose a governing law, within defined limits.
The Texas Supreme Court has adopted Restatement (Second) Section 187's provision that
(1) parties may choose any state's law to govern any issue which the parties could have
explicitly agreed to in the contract, and (2) for issues not capable of explicit agreement, the
parties may choose any law bearing a substantial relationship to the parties or the transac-
tion, unless it would violate a fundamental policy of a state having a materially greater
interest than the chosen state, and which would be the state selected under the contract
choice of law principles in Section 188. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670,
677-78 (Tex. 1990).
142. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are as follows: (a) the needs
of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the
relevant policies of other interested states, and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uni-
formity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2). This listing is not by
priority, which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant
relationship test includes the other choice of law sections throughout the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.
143. The exception is when a federal court rules on a constitutional issue such as dis-
cussed in National Western Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 86 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002,
pet. filed), discussed infra at notes 345-56.
144. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hakim Daccach, 105 S.W.3d 712 (Tex. App.-Austin
2003, pet. filed).
145. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4).
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insurance policies occurring in jurisdictions across the globe. Citizens In-
surance argued that a most-significant-relationship analysis under the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 6 pointed away from
Texas law because of the interests of other states dictated by the class
members' residences-an argument quickly refuted by the Texas statute
directing the application of Texas law to this category of securities
claims.
1 46
B. CHOICE OF LAW CLAUSES IN CONTRACTS
Texas law and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws permit
contracting parties to choose a governing law, 147 as reflected in two Sur-
vey period cases. Benchmark Electronics, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp.,'48 is a
reversal of a summary judgment on a choice of law issue. The trial court
applied New York law to Texas-based Benchmark's action for breach of
contract and fraud regarding its acquisition of defendant's New Jersey-
based subsidiary and granted defendant's summary judgment motion.
The Fifth Circuit found that, although the parties' contractual choice of
New York law controlled on the contract issues, that plaintiff's fraud
claims required application of the fraud and general tort provisions of
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws which pointed to Texas law
149
and the necessary remand.
In re Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas
Bumi Negara15 0 was an action to enforce a Swiss arbitration award re-
garding the construction of a geothermal electricity generating plant in
Indonesia. After plaintiff KBC won the arbitration, the two Indonesian
government-owned defendants obtained an Indonesian judgment setting
aside the award, and defendants sought to interpose that nullifying judg-
ment in KBC's action in a Texas federal court to enforce the arbitration.
The key issue was which law controlled the agreement to arbitrate. The
parties had agreed to the Swiss arbitration but their agreement was am-
biguous as to which law controlled. The court noted the presumption that
situs law governs arbitral proceedings, but further noted the parties' au-
tonomy to vary from that presumption. 151 After an extensive review of
the agreement and the parties' conduct, the Houston federal court held
that Swiss law governed and the Indonesian judgment was ineffective to
146. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 581-12, 33A(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003) (cited in
Citizens Ins. Co., 105 S.W.3d at 724); see generally Citizens Ins. Co., 105 S.W.3d at 723-26;
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(1) (approving of the forum's
statutory preemption of the most significant relationship test).
147. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187.
148. Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2003).
149. Id. at 726-28 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (gen-
eral tort provisions) and § 148 (fraud)). The court further noted the Texas requirement of
issue-by-issue choice of law analysis (known as depecage). Id. at 727.
150. In re Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perushaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negra, 264 F. Supp. 2d 490 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
151. Id. at 494-95.
2004]
SMU LAW REVIEW
nullify the award. 152
C. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TEST
If there is no statutory choice of law rule, and if contracting parties
have not made an effective choice of law, then Texas courts apply the
most significant relationship test from the Restatement (Second) of Con-
flict of Laws. 153 The Survey period produced four noteworthy cases ap-
plying the test.
In Zermeno v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,154 a federal court addressed
an unusual choice of law question-hypothetically-tied to fraudulent
joinder and removal. Zermeno is a surviving family member of a mother
and three children killed when an AeroMexico flight erratically landed,
left the runway, and struck their house. Zermeno settled with AeroMex-
ico but later claimed duress and sued AeroMexico, along with several
other defendants, in a Texas state court. Defendants removed the case to
federal court in Houston, and Zermeno moved to remand for lack of
complete diversity based on AeroMexico's presence as defendant.
Before Zermeno's remand motion could be heard, defendants moved for
a forum non conveniens dismissal. The court was faced with two motions,
one difficult and one routine. The difficult motion went to diversity juris-
diction and whether Zermeno had fraudulently joined AeroMexico to
prevent removal; the determining factor would be the legitimacy of the
release signed in Mexico that would bar any action against AeroMexico
and make removal possible. The more straightforward issue was whether
Mexico was a significantly preferable forum. Citing the United States Su-
preme Court's recent Ruhrgas155 decision, which now allows the flexibil-
ity to dispose of the case on forum non conveniens grounds without
addressing the more complex question of jurisdiction, the court granted
defendants forum non conveniens motion. Before getting to that issue,
however, the court took care to demonstrate the choice of law difficulties
in addressing AeroMexico's release. The court listed both the seven fac-
tors of the most significant relationship test under Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws Section 6 as well as the five contacts specifically gov-
erning contracts under Section 188. The court then recited the complex
evidence surrounding this issue, including its negotiation and signing in
152. Id. at 501.
153. The embodiment of the most significant relationship test are seven factors to be
balanced according to the needs of the particular case. They are as follows: (a) the needs
of the interstate and international systems; (b) the relevant policies of the forum; (c) the
relevant policies of other interested states; and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue; (d) the protection of justified expectations; (e) the
basic policies underlying the particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uni-
formity of result; and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2). This listing is not by
priority, which varies from case to case. Id. at cmt. c. In a larger sense, the most significant
relationship test includes the other choice of law sections throughout the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.
154. Zermoro v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 246 F. Supp. 2d 646, 646 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
155. Id. (citing Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574 (1999)).
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Mexico and Zermeno's claim of duress. The court then raised a second
choice of law question-the likelihood that Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws Section 145 would point to the application of Mexico's
law to the tort issues in the case's merits, and speculated as to difficulties
in that application as well. The court concluded that the better route was
to follow Ruhrgas and first address the forum non conveniens motion.15
6
Perkins v. Dynasty Group Auto' 57 is a wrongful death action in a one-
vehicle accident in Texas. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment and its decision to apply Texas law, perhaps a predict-
able conclusion at first glance, but made more complicated by the under-
lying facts. None of the passengers was from Texas, and the apparent
driver's negligence possibly included an employment relationship and vi-
carious liability issues. The trip originated in Florida as part of a "drive-
away" program in which people agree to drive cars to other locations for
resale there, with the drivers receiving no compensation but also not pay-
ing for the car's use. In this case, the vehicle was a 1994 Toyota minivan
and the multiple drivers were from Australia, Switzerland, England, Swe-
den and California. After stopping in San Antonio, the group left with-
out spending the night and had an accident early the next morning near
Sierra Blanca, Texas. All passengers were thrown from the car and one
later died. The decedent's estate and several passengers sued Florida-
based Dynasty Group Auto for alleged driver negligence. The court ap-
plied Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sections 6 and 145 (torts)
to conclude that Texas had the most significant relationship, in spite of
the parties being nonresidents, having formed their relationship in Flor-
ida, and more importantly, having formed the relationship with defendant
in Florida. The application of Texas law avoided Florida's "dangerous
instrumentality" doctrine which would have imposed a higher standard
on Dynasty. Although the opinion did not merit official reporting, it is
noted in this year's annual survey of American conflicts law, compared to
a number of cases involving claims against vehicle owners who lease or
loan them to others.158
In Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle,159 the court of appeals applied Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Section 148 in its reversal of the
trial court's certification of a consumer class of boat owners allegedly
victimized by rotting plywood. The court first noted the Supreme Court's
due process mandate barring states from applying their laws to claims too
weakly connected to the forum160 and then, analyzing the defendant's
Missouri home base and the plaintiff class's multi-state residences con-
156. Id. at 654-56.
157. Perkins v. Dynasty Group Auto, No. 08-01-00493-CV, 2003 WL 22810452 (Tex.
App.-El Paso Nov. 25, 2003, no pet. h.) (mem. opinion).
158. Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003: Seven-
teenth Annual Survey, 52 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1, 34-35 (2004).
159. Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2003, no pet.).
160. Id. at 355 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985)).
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cluded that no one state's law could control all the claims, thus undermin-
ing class formation.161 Although the opinion is grounded in the due
process mandate, it is an excellent survey of American states' consumer
product law, illustrating the difficulty of applying one state's law to multi-
state consumer claims.
Snow v. WRS Group, Inc.162 is an invasion of privacy action for the
unauthorized publication of a mother's child birth photographs on the
internet. The court concluded that Oregon law, as plaintiff's residence
and situs of her injury, should apply. Although the court was required to
follow Texas state law-meaning Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws Sections 6 and 145-the application was short-circuited by clear
Fifth Circuit precedent applying those sections to a significantly similar
claim. 163 In Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., the Fifth Circuit up-
held the trial court's selection of Mexico's law, under Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Conflict of Laws Sections 6 and 145, to govern a single-vehicle
accident in Mexico allegedly caused by American product defects.164 In
Benchmark Electronics, the Fifth Circuit injected a Restatement (Second)
discussion regarding fraud to reverse a district court's sua sponte sum-
mary judgment in which it applied the parties' choice of New York law to
all contract and tort issues.
165
D. OTHER CHOICE OF LAW ISSUES
1. Legislative Jurisdiction and Constitutional Limits on State Choice of
Law Rules
In a year when the Texas judicial focus was on personal jurisdiction, the
United States Supreme Court rendered the most important choice of law
decision in decades. In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,166 the
Court ruled that it would "abandon the balancing-of-interests approach
to conflicts [sic] of law under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 1 67 The
ruling affirmed a Nevada supreme court opinion that allowed a Nevada
resident to sue a California state tax agency under Nevada's relaxed im-
munity standards rather than California's complete immunity.
Under the former precedent, states faced with choice of law questions
were constitutionally required to assess the interests of the competing
states and, at the very least, weigh those interests in deciding which law to
apply. California urged the Court to retain interest-balancing at least
where "core sovereignty" interests were at stake. The Court declined,
161. Id. at 359-63.
162. Snow v. WRS Group, Inc., No. 02-50118, 02-50812, 2003 WL 21672844 (5th Cir.
July 17, 2003).
163. Id. at *2-3 (citing Wood v. Hustler Magazine, 736 F.2d 1084, 1087 (5th Cir. 1984)).
164. Vasquez v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 325 F.3d 665, 665 (5th Cir. 2003), discussed
supra at notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
165. Benchmark Elecs., Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corp., 343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir. 2003), dis-
cussed supra at notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
166. Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488 (2003).
167. Id. at 488-89 (referring to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10).
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pointing to the inherent difficulties in interest balancing: "Without a rud-
der to steer us, we decline to embark on the constitutional course of bal-
ancing coordinate States' competing sovereign interests to resolve
conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. ' 168 To the extent
the Court follows Franchise Tax Board in the future, the only significant
limit on state court choice of law analysis will be due process, which re-
quires a reasonable relationship between the parties, the dispute, and the
state whose law is applied.
1 69
Tracker Marine, discussed immediately above, noted the constitutional
limitation on states applying laws lacking a real connection to the
dispute. 170
2. False Conflicts
A false conflict exists when other potentially applicable laws are the
same as the forum's laws, or at least reach the same result. 171 Defining a
clear, outcome-changing difference between the forum's and the foreign
law is the first step in conducting a choice of law analysis, and the absence
of a clear conflict should result in the application of forum law.172 The
Survey period produced only one false conflict case. Vandeventer v. All
American Life & Casualty Company173 was an action by insureds for
breach of contract, illusory contract, and good faith and fair dealing
breach relating to the defendant's sale of policies to a Texas insurer,
American Insurance Company of Texas ("AICT"), who then cancelled
them. The trial judge granted summary judgment to defendant and plain-
tiffs appealed, including a challenge to the governing law. Plaintiffs were
from Indiana and South Carolina and purchased the policies there. The
168. Id. at 488. The Court left considerable room in its analysis for refining this radical
statement later, observing that: "States sovereign interests are not foreign to the full faith
and credit command. But we are not presented here with a case in which a State has
exhibited a 'policy of hostility to the public Acts' of a sister State." Id. (quoting Carroll v.
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413 (1955)).
169. See e.g., Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 714 (S.D. Tex. 2002),
discussed in James P. George & Anna K. Teller, Conflict of Laws, 56 SMU L. REv. 1283,
1324-26 (2003). The Supreme Court has also applied equal protection, privileges and im-
munities, the commerce clause, and the contract clause as a limit on choice of law deci-
sions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9 and comments following.
See also SCOLES & HAY, supra note 5, at 78-109; WEINTRAUB, supra note 1, at 585-648;
James P. George, Choice of Law: A Guide for Texas Attorneys, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 833,
844-46 (1994).
170. Tracker Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349, 349 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2003, no pet.), see supra notes 159-161 and accompanying text.
171. This is the Restatement's definition of false conflict. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, cmt. i; id. at § 186, cmt. c. A very different concept of false
conflicts came from Professor Brainerd Currie's government interest analysis, which de-
fines a false conflict as one in which only one state has a real interest. See SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 5, at 16-19. Unfortunately, Texas courts have used both definitions, as discussed
in George & Teller, supra note 169, 1335 n.396.
172. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shotts, 472 U.S. 797, 823-45 (1985) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).




dispute's only Texas connection was AICT, which was not a party to the
summary judgment or to the appeal. Plaintiffs argued on appeal for the
application of Indiana, and alternatively South Carolina law, but failed to
identify any distinction with Texas law. The court accordingly found no
conflict and no need for a choice of law analysis. 174 Having found no
conflict, this left the court free to pick and choose precedents as persua-
sive authority from Indiana, South Carolina, and other states.175
3. Proof of Foreign Law
Litigants seeking the application of another state's or nation's law must
comply with the forum's rules for pleading and proving foreign law. In
both Texas and federal courts, judicial notice is sufficient for the applica-
tion of sister-states' laws. 176 Foreign country law, on the other hand,
must be adequately pleaded and proven. 177 During the Survey period,
the Fifth Circuit upheld a trial court's refusal to apply Mexico's attorney-
client privilege in a breach of contract action,1 78 and the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals ignored a choice of law clause designating Florida
law, 179 both for the proponents' failure to demonstrate a difference with
otherwise applicable Texas law.
4. Use of the Forum's Procedural Rules
In Robin v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc.,180 plaintiffs appealed a take-noth-
ing judgment on their claim for job-related injuries while working for an
electric company in Louisiana. The trial court, after extensive argument,
ruled that Louisiana law applied under the Texas foreign personal injury
174. Id. at 711-12.
175. Id. at 712-24.
176. TEX. R. EVID. 202 allows a Texas court to take judicial notice of sister states' laws
on its own motion and requires it to do so upon a party's motion. Parties must supply
"sufficient information" for the court to comply. Id. Federal practice is the same under
federal common law; neither the Federal Rules of Evidence nor the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure address judicial notice of American states' laws. See Lamar v. Micou, 114 U.S.
218, 223 (1885); Kucel v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 813 F.2d 67, 74 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
though FED. R. EvID. 201 (the sole federal evidence rule dealing with judicial notice) does
not apply to states' laws, we should assume that Lamar's judicial notice mandate for Amer-
ican states' laws is subject to FED. R. EVID. 201(b)'s provision for proof of matters "capa-
ble of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
reasonably be questioned." That is, federal courts may take judicial notice of American
states' laws from (1) official statutory and case reports, (2) widely-used unofficial versions,
or (3) copies, all subject to evidentiary rules on authentication and best evidence.
177. TEX. R. EvID. 203 requires written notice of foreign law by pleading or other rea-
sonable notice at least thirty days before trial, including all written materials or sources
offered as proof. For non-English originals, parties must provide copies of both the origi-
nal and the English translation. Sources include affidavits, testimony, briefs, treatises, and
any other material source, whether or not submitted by a party, and whether or not other-
wise admissible under the Texas Rules of Evidence. Federal practice is similar. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 44.1.
178. In re Avantel, S.A., 343 F.3d 311, 321-22 (5th Cir. 2003).
179. Fraud-Tech, Inc. v. Choicepoint, Inc., 102 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, pet. denied).




statute. This issue was not appealed, but another choice of law issue
arose on appeal when plaintiffs challenged the trial court's instructions of
the duty of care and its assessment of the weight of the evidence support-
ing the verdict. Both parties cited Louisiana law on these issues, and the
court of appeals took care to point out that on procedural issues such as
standard of review and assessment of trial court discretion, Texas law
governed rather than Louisiana law.
181
III. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
Foreign judgments from other states and countries create Texas conflict
of laws issues in two ways: (1) their local enforcement, and (2) their
preclusive effect on local lawsuits. Foreign judgments include those from
sister states and foreign country judgments, but do not include federal
court judgments from districts outside Texas because those judgments are
enforced as local federal court judgments.
182
A. ENFORCEMENT
Texas recognizes two methods of enforcing foreign judgments: the
common-law method using the foreign judgment as the basis for a local
lawsuit, 183 and, since 1981, the more direct procedure under the two uni-
form judgment acts, along with similar acts for arbitration awards, child
custody and child support. There were no instances of common-law en-
forcement during the Survey period.184
1. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) pro-
vides for summary enforcement of non-Texas judgments that are entitled
to full faith and credit.185 This includes sister-state judgments as well as
foreign country money judgments that Texas recognizes under the Uni-
181. Id. at 885.
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (West Supp. 2002).
183. The underlying mandate for the common law enforcement is the full faith and
credit clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1, and its statutory
counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act spe-
cifically reserves the common law method as an alternative. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 35.008 (Vernon 1997).
184. Examples of common law enforcement after the UEFJA's enactment include Mc-
Fadden v. Farmers and Merchants Bank, 689 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, no
writ); Cal Growers, Inc. v. Palmer Warehouse & Transfer Co., 687 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v. Rector, 710 S.W.2d 100 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Escalona v. Combs, 712 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ); Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211 (Tex. 1985).
185. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.001-.007 (Vernon 1997). The Act re-
quires (1) the judgment creditor to file a copy of the judgment authenticated under federal
or Texas law, id. at § 35.003; (2) notice to the judgment debtor from the clerk, id. at
§ 35.004, or the judgment creditor, id. at § 35.005. The judgment debtor may (1) move to
stay enforcement if grounds exist under the law of Texas or the rendering state, id. at
35.006; and (2) challenge enforcement along traditional full faith and credit grounds such
as the rendering state's lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at § 35.003.
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form Foreign Country Money-Judgment Recognition Act (UFCM-
JRA).1 86 The Survey period produced two UEFJA cases and no foreign
money judgment cases. Russo v. Dear187 clarified the impropriety of
challenging the merits of a valid and final sister-state judgment. Barbara
Russo hired private investigator, Dear, to investigate her friend's death,
which required Dear to travel to Ohio. Russo later sued Dear in Texas
for overcharges and fraud. Dear counterclaimed for defamation, but his
insurance carrier settled with Russo without Dear's permission. When
Dear then sued Russo in Ohio, Russo moved to dismiss on the grounds
that Dear's claims were raised or should have been raised in his Texas
counterclaim. The Ohio court ruled against Russo and issued a judgment
in Dear's favor. Dear attempted enforcement in Texas but failed because
of the Ohio judgment's non-finality. Dear then obtained a nunc pro tunc
judgment in Ohio that cured the finality problem and again sought en-
forcement in Texas. The Texas trial court again refused enforcement on
non-finality grounds, but the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed after find-
ing that the nunc pro tunc judgment had achieved finality. On remand,
Russo again raised her objections to the Ohio court's errors but lost. The
court of appeals affirmed, noting that Russo's collateral attacks on the
Ohio judgment were not permitted under the Constitution's full faith and
credit clause.
188
The same issue-attacks on the foreign judgment's merits-arose in
Adriano v. Finova Capital Corporation189 and had the same outcome.
The claim originated as Finova's action in an Arizona federal court to
collect on the Adrianos' guaranties on a defaulted loan to their restau-
rant. The federal court in Arizona entered judgment against the Adria-
nos as a sanction for discovery abuse and other wrongs in the case, and
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. When Finova domesticated
the Ninth Circuit judgment in a Texas state court, the Adrianos filed a
186. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001-.008 (Vernon 1997). Like the
UEFJA, the UFCMJRA requires the judgment creditor to file a copy of the foreign coun-
try judgment that has been authenticated under federal or Texas law, id. at § 36.0041, with
notice to the debtor provided either by the clerk, id. at § 36.0042, or the creditor, id. at
§ 36.0043. The judgment debtor has thirty days to challenge enforcement, or sixty if domi-
ciled in a foreign country, with a twenty-day extension available for good cause. Id. at
§ 36.0044. Unlike the UEFJA, the UFCMJRA explicitly states ten grounds for non-recog-
nition-three mandatory and seven discretionary. Briefly stated, the mandatory grounds
are (1) lack of an impartial tribunal, (2) lack of personal jurisdiction, and (3) lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id. at § 36.005(a). The discretionary grounds for non-recognition are
that the foreign action (1) involved inadequate notice, (2) was obtained by fraud, (3) vio-
lates Texas public policy, (4) is contrary to another final judgment, (5) is contrary to the
parties' agreement (e.g., a contrary forum selection clause), (6) was in an inconvenient
forum, and (7) is not from a country granting reciprocal enforcement rights. Id. at
§ 36.005(b). The UFCMJRA also provides for stays, id. at § 36.007, and expressly reserves
the right of enforcement of non-money judgments under traditional, non-statutory stan-
dards, id. at § 36.008. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (comity as discretionary
grounds for recognizing and enforcing foreign country judgments).
187. Russo v. Dear, 105 S.W.3d 43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied).
188. Id. at 46-47.
189. Adrano v. Finova Capital Corp., No. 04-02-00796-CV, 2003 WL 21696300 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Aug. 22, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. opinion).
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motion for new trial, arguing that their Arizona attorney had withdrawn
without telling them and that they had no notice of that case. The Texas
trial court denied their motion for new trial, and the San Antonio Court
of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that any wrongs occurring in a sister-
state court having jurisdiction were immune from attack now because of
the full faith and credit required for that judgment.190 There were no
UFCMJRA cases during the Survey period.
2. Arbitration Enforcement
Foreign arbitration awards may be enforced in Texas under federal and
state law. 191 The only case this period, Bridas S.A.P.LC. v. Government
of Turkmenistan,192 was an action by an Argentine corporation to enforce
an arbitration award issued against the government of Turkmenistan.
The dispute arose from a joint venture agreement between Bridas and a
production association called Turkmenneft, created and owned by the
Turkmenistan government, whose purpose was to exploit minerals in an
area of southwestern Turkmenistan known as Keimir. In November 1995,
the Turkmenistan government ordered Bridas to cease operations and
prohibited further imports or exports.193 Bridas submitted the dispute to
arbitration with the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, pursu-
ant to an arbitration clause in the joint venture agreement. The ICC tri-
bunal awarded Bridas $495 million in January 2001, against both
Turkmenneft and the Turkmenistan government. 194 When they refused
to pay, Bridas sued in the Southern District of Texas, seeking to confirm
and enforce the award under the Federal Arbitration Act. Defendants
objected on grounds including Turkmenistan's immunity and its not hav-
ing been a party to the joint venture. The district court held in Bridas's
favor on all points and defendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit upheld the
award as to the private company Turkmenneft, but vacated it as to the
government, rejecting Bridas's arguments that tied the government to its
private company, including agency, alter ego, estoppel, and third party
beneficiary.195
3. Family Law Judgments
Texas laws also provide for recognition and enforcement of sister-state
and foreign-country child custody under the Uniform Child Custody Ju-
risdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) 196 and child support under the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). 197 This past year pro-
190. Id. at *2-3.
191. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (2000); Texas International Arbi-
tration Act, TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE § 172.082(t) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2003).
192. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2003).
193. Id. at 351-52.
194. Id. at 352.
195. Id. at 353-63.
196. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 152.001-.317 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
197. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 159. 001-.902 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004).
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duced one of each. In the Interest of K.L.V. and K.J. V.198 points out the
need to respond quickly to notices of foreign judgments, or in this case,
foreign custody orders. The parents were married in Utah and had chil-
dren in 1991 and 1995. They divorced in Nevada in 1998, and pursuant to
the parties' agreement, the mother took the children to her home in Nor-
way. In February 2000, the father filed again in Nevada seeking the chil-
dren's return and change of custody, and the court granted his motion in
March 2000. Then in May, the father and his girlfriend met the mother
and the children in a hotel in Norway to celebrate one of the children's
birthdays, and it is not difficult to guess what followed. The father per-
suaded the mother to allow him to take the children back to his room for
a surprise, and when the mother later went to the room, the surprise was
that father, girlfriend and the children had left for the father's new resi-
dence in Texas. 199
In October 2000, the Nevada court entered further orders exercising
child custody jurisdiction until another court assumed that role, ordering
the surrender of the children's passports and that they remain in Texas
pending further custody orders. The father followed up with a custody
modification action in Texas, but before that could be adjudicated, the
mother returned to Nevada and was able to persuade the Nevada Su-
preme Court to vacate everything and find that Nevada lacked child cus-
tody jurisdiction and that any further determinations should occur under
Hague Convention guidelines. The mother then filed the Nevada opinion
in Texas where the custody action was still pending. The Texas court took
judicial notice of the Nevada opinion. After all this litigation, which also
included forums in England and Norway, the father failed to perfect a
timely appeal from the court's entry of the Nevada order, and the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals declined review.200
Harris v. Harris,201 the Survey period's only interstate child support
enforcement case, highlights the need for uniform laws in this area. The
parties married in 1984 and divorced in 1994, living all that time in Jack-
son, Mississippi. The mother was granted full custody of their only child
and the father was granted visitation and ordered to pay child support
and alimony. The father soon moved to Baton Rouge, Louisiana and ap-
parently paid support only sporadically. In January 2000, the Mississippi
court ordered the father to pay $30,659.70 to the mother in arrearages.
The court's second order reduced the amount with a $6,000 offset as a
credit for payments, and in its third order directed withholding from the
father's wages (presumably in Louisiana). The mother and child moved
198. In re K.L.V. & K.J.V. 109 S.W.3d 61 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied).
199. Id. at 63.
200. Id. at 64-67. The applicable statute is Texas Family Code Ann. § 152.314 (Vernon
2002), part of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. See also In re
Y.M.A., 111 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2003, no pet.), a straightforward and
expedited enforcement of an Egyptian custody decree over the father's objections.
201. Harris v. Harris, No. 03-02-00404-CV, 2003 WL 742362 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 6,
2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
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to Austin in March 2000, leading the father to complain to the Mississippi
court that he lacked access to his son and to move for custody modifica-
tion. Meanwhile, the mother filed two new lawsuits, one in Travis
County, Texas, seeking to modify the Mississippi orders, and a second in
Louisiana to enforce the Mississippi arrearages orders.
202
At this point there were actions in three states and no party lived in
Mississippi, but the Mississippi court nonetheless found mother in con-
tempt and suspended its prior arrearages orders. Father registered this
new Mississippi ruling in the Louisiana action, which the Louisiana court
recognized as controlling, thus ordering suspension of prior support
awards. Mother then asked the Texas court to "recognize" the earlier
Mississippi orders as controlling and to "reinstate" them, but she failed to
register any foreign orders as required under UIFSA. 20 3 Father also reg-
istered in the Texas court the foreign orders favoring him (both as to
custody and child support), and mother cured her misfiling with proper
copies of the earlier Mississippi orders.
The Texas trial court assumed jurisdiction over the custody issue and
named mother the sole managing conservator and father possessory con-
servator, but declined jurisdiction as to child support, finding that the
Louisiana court now had jurisdiction over support issues. The Austin
Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Louisiana had assumed jurisdic-
tion and that in any event, Texas could not determine child support be-
cause it lacked personal jurisdiction over the father.
B. PRECLUSION
Both sister-state and foreign country judgments are entitled to preclu-
sive effect in Texas courts. The full faith and credit clause compels full
faith and credit for valid and final sister-state judgments involving the
same parties and claims, as well as collateral estoppel if the required ele-
ments are satisfied.204 Under the doctrine of comity, foreign country
judgments may also be given res judicata and preclusive effect, subject to
discretion based on the nature of the foreign proceeding and the satisfac-
tion of traditional preclusion requirements.
20 5
1. Interstate Preclusion
Acridge v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Society206 demon-
strates how a prior state court decision could determine federal subject
matter jurisdiction. This was an action for nursing home negligence relat-
ing to an Alzheimer's patient's murder by his roommate. The victim,
202. Id. at *1.
203. See id. at *2 (discussing the filing and notice requirements under Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. §§ 159.602. .605.608 (Vernon Supp. 2004)).
204. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see WEINTRAUB, supra note 1,
at 701-02.
205. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 5, at 999-1001.




Louis Acridge, had been a sheriff in New Mexico since 1968. In 1996,
suffering from Alzheimer's dementia, he was placed in a nursing home in
New Mexico. His wife moved him to a nursing home in Texas in 1997,
where Louis was assigned to a room with a resident having violent history
and who murdered Louis in June 1999. His family sued the nursing home
and individual defendants for negligence, and plaintiffs' choice of a fed-
eral court led defendants to challenge diversity jurisdiction, arguing that
both Louis and some defendants were from Texas.
20 7
Federal diversity jurisdiction turns on the fiction of state citizenship,
which in turn rests on domicile. 20 8 Although federal jurisdiction is statu-
tory, its domicile component is federal common law, and the issue here
was whether Mary, as Louis's guardian, had the authority to change his
domicile from New Mexico to Texas when she moved him here. The
question was one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, and one on which
other circuits were split.209 After examining the reasons underlying the
split, the court opted for the rule applied in the Tenth and Seventh Cir-
cuits, giving guardians the power to change an incompetent's domicile if
acting in his best interest.
210
Defendants argued that Mary had in fact changed Louis's domicile to
Texas when she moved him here and obtained Texas Medicaid benefits
starting in 1997. The court found this persuasive except for one possibly
preclusive roadblock-a New Mexico probate court had already accepted
jurisdiction over Louis's estate. Plaintiffs argued that this probate deter-
mination was binding on the federal court, and the court of appeals noted
that it could be under the full faith and credit clause, that it was required
to give the New Mexico decision. The court further noted that full faith
and credit required the federal court to give the New Mexico ruling the
same effect it would have in New Mexico. Preclusion failed here on sev-
eral grounds, including the court's finding that Louis's domicile was not
fully litigated as part of that process, was not necessary to a New Mexico
probate (which also allows non-domiciliary probates), and was being used
here against defendants who were not parties to the New Mexico case.
With that issue resolved, the court held that Louis was a Texas domicili-
ary and dismissed for lack of diversity. 211 In spite of issue preclusion's
failure here, it is noteworthy that a properly litigated state court issue
may be determinative of jurisdiction in later state and federal cases.
2. International Preclusion
Both international preclusion cases this Survey period involved judg-
ments from Mexico's courts. International Transactions, Ltd. v. Embotel-
207. Id. at 446-47.
208. See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974); see also JAMES P. GEORGE,
THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR (2002) at 73-75.
209. Acridge, 334 F.3d at 449.
210. Id. at 450.
211. Id. at 452-53.
[Vol. 57
Conflict of Laws
ladora Agral Regiomontana, S.A. de CV.,212 involved the recognition,
and rejection on appeal, of a Mexican bankruptcy decision invalidating an
arbitration award. International Transactions, Ltd ("ITL") sued in a state
district court in Dallas to confirm the award. Defendant Embotelladora
removed to federal court, which then disallowed ITL's claim because of a
Mexican bankruptcy court ruling. The federal court based its decision on
federal common law and comity as established in Hilton v. Guyot.2 13 The
Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the Mexican bankruptcy court's
ruling had been ex parte and without notice to ITL, and then remanded
the case to the district court for further consideration.
214
In Fidalgo v. Galan,215 a Mexican divorce decree invalidated a later
Texas decree. The parties married in 1985 in Brownsville, Texas, lived in
Texas until 1990, moved back to Mexico and separated in 1997. Wife
Mercedes Fidalgo was granted a divorce in Mexico in 1998 and then re-
turned to live in Texas, where in 1999 she filed another divorce action
from which she obtained a no-answer default judgment. Husband Galan
filed this bill of review seeking to set aside the Texas divorce decree,
which the trial court granted. The court of appeals affirmed on grounds
including the finality of the Mexican divorce rendered the original Texas
court without jurisdiction.
216
212. Int'l Transactions. Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana, S.A. de C.V., 347
F.3d 589 (5th Cir. 2003).
213. Id. at 593 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1895)).
214. Id. at 596. Judge Smith dissented on the grounds that ITL had actual knowledge of
the bankruptcy and did not take sufficient action, thus waiving any objection to not receiv-
ing notice of a specific ruling later. Id. at 596-98. This case is not discussed in the arbitra-
tion section because that was not the issue, and is not discussed in the enforcement of
foreign judgments section because the issue here was issue preclusion with the Mexican's
bankruptcy court's finding.
215. Fidalgo v. Galan, No. 13-02-469-CV, 2003 WL 21982186 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Aug. 21, 2003, no pet.) (mem. opinion).
216. Id. at *2-3.
20041
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